CRIME WITHOUT A HUMAN: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ALGORITHM AND THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF THE CONCEPT OF GUILT IN CRIMINAL LAW

Abstract

The article examines emerging theoretical and practical challenges in criminal law caused by the rapid development of artificial intelligence technologies. The possibility of recognizing artificial intelligence systems as autonomous subjects of crime is analyzed. It is established that contemporary criminal law doctrine is based on the offender’s consciousness, free will, guilt and ability to understand the social and legal consequences of their conduct. It is determined that current artificial intelligence systems do not possess these characteristics. The problems of establishing guilt, causation and criminal liability for socially dangerous acts committed through autonomous algorithmic systems are described. International legal instruments, foreign legal scholarship and comparative legal approaches to the regulation of artificial intelligence are considered. The concepts of granting artificial intelligence the status of an “electronic person”, imposing direct criminal liability on AI systems and treating algorithmic processes as functionally equivalent to human consciousness are critically assessed. It is established that, at the current stage of technological development, recognizing artificial intelligence as an independent subject of crime lacks sufficient theoretical and practical justification. Criteria for allocating responsibility among manufacturers, developers, integrators, owners, operators and users are identified. The need to develop algorithmic auditing, technical expertise, digital evidence procedures and mechanisms for the preliminary assessment of technological risks is substantiated.